The role of search engine optimization in search marketing by Berman, R & Katona, Z
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
The role of search engine optimization in search marketing
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2v02v30c
Journal
Marketing Science, 32(4)
ISSN
0732-2399
Authors
Berman, R
Katona, Z
Publication Date
2013
DOI
10.1287/mksc.2013.0783
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
The Role of Search Engine Optimization in Search
Marketing∗
Ron Berman and Zsolt Katona†
February 1, 2013
∗We wish to thank Pedro Gardete, Ganesh Iyer, Shachar Kariv, John Morgan, Miklos Sarvary, Dana
Sisak, Felix Vardy, Kenneth Wilbur, Yi Zhu and seminar participants at HKUST, University of Florida,
University of Houston, UT Austin, and Yale for their useful comments.
†Ron Berman is Ph.D. candidate and Zsolt Katona is Assistant Professor at the Haas School of Busi-
ness, UC Berkeley, 94720-1900 CA. E-mail: ron berman@haas.berkeley.edu, zskatona@haas.berkeley.edu.
The Role of Search Engine Optimization in Search
Marketing
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of search engine optimization (SEO) on the competition
between advertisers for organic and sponsored search results. The results show that a positive
level of search engine optimization may improve the search engine’s ranking quality and thus the
satisfaction of its visitors. In the absence of sponsored links, the organic ranking is improved by
SEO if and only if the quality provided by a website is sufficiently positively correlated with its
valuation for consumers. In the presence of sponsored links, the results are accentuated and hold
regardless of the correlation. When sponsored links serve as a second chance to acquire clicks
from the search engine, low quality websites have a reduced incentive to invest in SEO, giving
an advantage to their high quality counterparts. As a result of the high expected quality on the
organic side, consumers begin their search with an organic click. Although SEO can improve
consumer welfare and the payoff of high quality sites, we find that the search engine’s revenues are
typically lower when advertisers spend more on SEO and thus less on sponsored links. Modeling
the impact of the minimum bid set by the search engine reveals an inverse-U shaped relationship
between the minimum bid and search engine profits, suggesting an optimal minimum bid that is
decreasing in the level of SEO activity.
1 Introduction
Consumers using a search engine face the option of clicking organic or sponsored links. The
organic links are ranked according to their relevance to the search query, while the sponsored
links are allocated to advertisers through a competitive auction. Since consumers tend to trust
organic links more, advertisers often try to increase their visibility in the organic list by gam-
ing the search engine’s ranking algorithm using techniques collectively known as search engine
optimization (SEO)1.
A notable example of the dramatic impact an SEO campaign can have is that of JCPenney,
an American retailer. This retailer’s organic links skyrocketed during the 2010 holiday shopping
season and suddenly climbed to the top of the search results for many general keywords such
as “dresses”, “bedding” and “furniture”.2 JCPenney eventually fired their SEO contractor after
finding out that they used “black hat” techniques that eventually led to a punitive response from
Google. Search engine optimization is widespread in the world of online advertising; a 2010 survey
of 1500 advertisers and agencies revealed that 90% of them engaged in SEO compared to 81%
who purchased sponsored links.3 In the past few years, search engine optimization has grown to
become a multi-billion dollar business.4
This paper explores the economics of the SEO process and its effects on consumers, advertisers
and search engines. Using a game theoretical model we fully characterize the incentives and
tradeoffs of all players in the ecosystem. Our model consists of (i) advertisers with exogenous
qualities and potentially correlated valuations for clicks, competing for the attention of consumers,
(ii) a search engine that offers both organic and sponsored links and can set minimum bids, and
(iii) consumers who engage in costly search to find the highest quality site. In order to capture the
effect of SEO, we model the imperfections in the algorithms used by search engines, assuming that
there is a measurement error that prevents the search engine from perfectly ordering links according
to quality. Advertisers can, in turn, manipulate the potentially erroneous quality observations to
their advantage through SEO and improve their ranking. A key parameter of our model is the
effectiveness of SEO, determining the extent to which SEO efforts by advertisers affect the organic
results.
We first ask how SEO changes the organic results and whether these changes are always
1We focus only on “black hat” SEO which does not improve the actual relevance of the webpage to the query,
but just games the ranking algorithm.
2“The Dirty Little Secrets of Search”, The New York Times, Feb 12, 2011.
3“The SEMPO Annual State of Search Survey 2010”.
4“US Interactive Marketing Forecast, 2009 to 2014”, Forrester Research, July 6, 2009.
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detrimental to consumers and high quality advertisers. The interest in this question stems from
the strong stance that search engines typically take against SEO by emphasizing the potential
downside on organic link quality. To justify their position, search engines typically claim that
manipulation of search engine results hurts consumer satisfaction and decreases the welfare of
“honest” sites. In contrast, search engines also convey the message that the auction mechanism for
sponsored links ensures that the best advertisers will obtain the links of highest quality, resulting in
higher social and consumer welfare. This reasoning suggests that consumers should trust sponsored
links more than organic links in equilibrium, and would prefer to start searching on the sponsored
side. A substantial contribution of using a sophisticated model for consumers is that we are able
to derive their optimal search behavior. Contrary to claims by search engines, we find that search
engines fight SEO because of the trade-off advertisers face between investing in sponsored links
and investing in influencing organic rankings. Consequently, search engines may lose revenue if
sites spend significant amounts on SEO activities instead of on paid links and content creation.
To approach the issue of diminished welfare from SEO, we first focus on the case where spon-
sored links are not available to advertisers and consumers. This base model serves as a benchmark
and gives us a deeper understanding of the nature of the competition for organic links when using
SEO activities. Our first result reveals that SEO can be advantageous by improving the organic
ranking. In the absence of sponsored links, this only happens when advertiser quality and valua-
tion are positively correlated. That is, if sites’ valuations for consumers are correlated with their
qualities then consumers are better off with some positive level of SEO than without. By contrast,
if there are sites that extract high value from visitors yet provide them with low quality then SEO
is generally detrimental to consumer welfare. The SEO process essentially allows sites with a high
value for consumers to correct the search engine’s imperfect ranking through a contest.
The second question we ask focuses on the full interaction between organic and sponsored links
when SEO is possible. The institutional differences between the organic and sponsored lists are
critical to the understanding of our model. First, advertisers usually pay for SEO services up front
and the effects can take months to materialize. Bids for sponsored links, on the other hand, can be
frequently adjusted depending on the ordering of the organic list. Second, SEO typically involves
a lump sum payment for initial results and the variable portion of the cost tends to be convex,
whereas payment for sponsored links is on a per-click basis with very little or no initial investment.
Finally, there is substantial uncertainty as to the outcome of the SEO process depending on the
search engine algorithms, whereas sponsored links are allocated through a deterministic auction.
Interestingly, the presence of sponsored links accentuates the results of the base model and
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SEO favors the high quality advertiser regardless of the correlation between quality and valuation.
The intuition is that sponsored links act as a backup for high quality advertisers in case they do
not possess the top organic link. When consumers have low search costs, they will eventually find
the high quality advertiser, reducing the value of the organic position for a low quality player. In
equilibrium, consumers will start searching on the organic side and high quality sites will have an
increased chance of acquiring the organic link as SEO becomes more effective.
Although SEO clearly favors high quality advertisers, we find that there is a strong tension
between the interests of consumers and the search engine. As advertisers spend more on SEO
and consumers are more likely to find what they are looking for on the organic side, they are
less likely to click on revenue generating sponsored links. This tension may explain why search
engines take such a strong stance against SEO, even though they favor a similar mechanism on
the sponsored side. Furthermore, we obtain an important normative result that could help search
engines mitigate the revenue loss due to SEO: we find that there is an optimal minimum bid the
search engine can set that is decreasing in the intensity of SEO. Setting the minimum bid too
high, however, could drive more advertiser dollars away from the sponsored side towards SEO.
As common the practice of SEO may be, research on the topic is scant. Many papers have
focused on sponsored links and some on the interaction between the two lists. In all of these cases,
however, the ranking of a website in the organic list is assumed exogenous, and the possibility
of investing in SEO is ignored. On the topic of sponsored search, works such as those by Rutz
and Bucklin (2007) and Ghose and Yang (2009) focus on consumer response to search advertising
and the different characteristics that impact advertising efficiency. Other recent examples, such
as those by Chen and He (2011), Athey and Ellison (2012) and Xu et al. (2011) analyze models
that include both consumers and advertisers as active players.
A number of recent papers study the interplay between organic and sponsored lists. Katona
and Sarvary (2010) show that the top organic sites may not have an incentive to bid for sponsored
links. In an empirical piece, Yang and Ghose (2010) show that organic links have a positive effect
on the click-through rates of paid links, potentially increasing profits. Taylor (2012), White (2009)
and Xu et al. (2012) study how the incentives of the search engine to provide high quality organic
results are affected by potential losses on sponsored links. The general notion is that search engines
have an incentive to provide lower quality results in order to maximize revenues.
The work of Xing and Lin (2006) is the closest antecedent to our paper. It defines “algorithm
quality” and “algorithm robustness” to describe the search engine’s ability to accurately identify
relevant websites. Their paper shows that when advertisers’ valuations for organic links is high
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enough, SEO is sustainable and SEO service providers can then free-ride on the search engine due
to their “parasitic nature”. The relationship between advertiser qualities and valuations and the
strategic nature of consumer search are not taken into account. An earlier work by Sen (2005)
develops a theoretical model that examines the optimal strategy of mixing between investing in
SEO and buying ad placements. Surprisingly, the model shows that SEO should not exist as part
of an equilibrium strategy.
2 Model
We set up a static game in which consumers search for a phrase and advertisers compete for their
visits. We assume there is a monopolistic search engine that provides search results to consumers
by displaying links to one of two websites. These sites can also buy sponsored links from the search
engine. Whenever a consumer enters the search phrase, the search engine ranks the sites according
to a scoring mechanism, and presents one organic link and one sponsored link according to the
scores and bids of the sites. The incentives and characteristics of the search engine, advertisers,
and consumers are described below.
2.1 Websites and Consumers
Consumers in our model seek to consume one unit of a good that can have a quality qi ∈ {qL, qH}
with qH > qL. The good is provided by websites and can either be information, content or a
physical product. Regardless of its nature, the good provides a utility of qi to those who consume
it (net of price). The two possible quality levels of qH and qL are common knowledge, but consumers
need to search to discover the particular qualities provided by each website. When visiting the
search engine, consumers see an organic link and possibly a sponsored link. In order to discover
the quality provided by a site consumers need to click the links. Upon visiting a site they incur
a search cost c ≥ 0 and discover the quality of the good. Then consumers decide whether to
continue the search, abandon it, or consume the good they had found. The decision on which
link to start with (organic or sponsored) and the decision to continue searching depends on the
expected distribution of qualities behind each link. A rational consumer will continue searching
only if the expected increase in utility from visiting the next link outweighs the search cost. Once
the consumer has decided to stop searching, she will consume the good with the highest net utility,
possibly returning to a previously visited link.
As an example, if the consumer started searching with the organic link and found a website
providing quality qH , she has no reason to continue searching. She will consume the good yielding
utility of qH−c. If, on the other hand, she started searching with the organic link and found a site
5
providing quality qL, she will prefer to continue searching when search costs are low. If she also
found qL behind the sponsored link when continuing, she would eventually receive utility qL − 2c.
The website that provides the good chosen receives an exogenously determined revenue valued
at vi ∈ {vL, vH} with vH > vL. The total revenue of site i (net of manufacturing costs) is thus
the number of consumers who consume its good multiplied by vi. For example, in case when the
good is a product sold by the advertiser, vi can be thought of as the per unit margin of the seller.
The individual site qualities qi and valuations vi are known by the competing websites, but are
unknown to the consumers or the search engine a priori. However, the following distribution is
common knowledge: Pr(qi = qL) = Pr(qi = qH) =
1
2
, Pr(vi = vL) = Pr(vi = vH) =
1
2
, and the
correlation between qi and vi is ρ for each site i. Both qualities and valuations are independent
across sites. The sign of the correlation between the quality and valuation of a particular site
could be driven by several factors in a market. For example, in a vertically differentiated market
firms offering a higher quality product can charge a premium and often make a higher margin,
suggesting a possibly positive correlation. However, a negative correlation is also possible between
qualities and valuations due to deceptive marketing practices or interaction with other channels.
To influence their organic ranking, websites can invest SEO effort ei at a quadratic cost of
e2i
2
. In order to win the sponsored link, websites submit per-click bids, denoted by bi. The total
payment for the sponsored link is determined in a generalized second price auction with minimum
bid r, where bids are corrected for expected click-through rates (CTRs). The final payoff of site i
is therefore its revenue minus the SEO investments costs and the sponsored payment.
2.2 The Search Engine
The search engine acts as an intermediary between consumers and websites. Its goal is to provide
consumers with links to the highest quality websites on the organic side while making a profit
through the auctioning of sponsored links. In order to rank websites, the search engine scores
each website on its estimated quality using information gathered from the Internet using crawling
algorithms and data mining methods. The search engine can therefore only measure quality with
an error and cannot observe it directly. We model the score of each site as
si = qi + αei + εi, (1)
where α is a parameter denoting the effectiveness of SEO, and εi is the measurement noise,
distributed according to a distribution with c.d.f. Fε and mean 0. The parameter α measures
how easy it is to change one’s ranking using SEO methods. That is, 1/α influences the cost of
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SEO which can be controlled by several factors including the search engine. Indeed, if the search
engine ignores the possibility of SEO activities, α presumably increases.
Sponsored links are awarded by the search engine in a standard click-through rate corrected
second price auction with a reserve minimum bid of r. If website i has an expected click-through
rate ctri, the search engine awards the links in order of the ranking of the scores ctri · bi, as long
as they are higher than the minimum bid. When a consumer clicks on a sponsored link, the
website who owns it pays the bid of the next highest bidder corrected for the click-through-rate
differences. The click-through rates are a result of the endogenous consumer search process in
equilibrium. They determine the payoff of the search engine, as well as influence the incentives
of the advertisers to invest in SEO. Our model takes these click-through rates into account when
considering the bids of advertisers for sponsored links.
2.3 Timing
At the beginning of the game the search engine publishes the minimum bid for sponsored links
r. In parallel, Nature determines the quality qi and the valuation vi for each website given the
correlation parameter ρ, but independently across sites. Then, websites decide on the amount
of effort ei to invest in SEO. The search engine then determines the scores si of each site, and
publishes their score ranking. Following the organic ranking, sites bid for the sponsored links which
are then awarded according to a CTR-corrected generalized second price auction with minimum
bid r. Once both rankings have been finalized consumers initiate a search process.
Before visiting the search engine, consumers decide which link gives them the highest expected
utility and start their search with that link.5 The consumers then decide whether to consume the
good encountered or continue their search. Once the consumer has searched through all of the
links, decided to stop searching and consume, payoffs are realized.
3 SEO Equilibrium
3.1 Organic links only
When the minimum bid is higher than the profit websites expect from a visitor, advertisers cannot
afford sponsored links. This scenario is very common when sites provide free content to consumers
and make a profit by selling advertising. It also serves as a benchmark case before analyzing the
5Since there might be a case with no sponsored links, we assume that consumers incur the cost c of the first
search even if their favorite link does not exist. This is a technical assumption that makes the analysis cleaner.
Alternative, and perhaps more realistic, assumptions lead to similar results.
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impact of sponsored links on the SEO process. The expected payoff of site i is then
pii = vi · Pr(si > sj)− e
2
i
2
(2)
To illustrate our results, we assume that the measurement error has a uniform distribution
εi ∼ U [−σ2 , σ2 ] with a large enough support6. To show the impact of SEO on consumers and the
overall ranking, we use P (α) = P (α;σ, v1, v2, q1, q2) to denote the efficiency of the ranking process,
which is the probability of the website with the highest quality winning the organic link. Since
the utility of the consumer is the quality of the consumed good, consumer welfare increases with
efficiency.
Simple analysis shows that when search engine optimization is not possible, i.e., when α = 0,
we get P (0) < 1 as long as q1 6= q2 due to the noise in the ranking process. Furthermore, P (0, σ)
is decreasing in σ as higher levels of noise make the ranking less efficient. When search engine
optimization becomes effective, i.e., when α > 0, websites can actively influence the order of
results. The following proposition summarizes how SEO affects the ranking, consumer welfare
and firm profits.
Proposition 1
1. When ρ = 1, any α > 0 which is not too large improves the efficiency of the ranking and
consumer satisfaction. However, when ρ = −1, SEO is detrimental to consumer satisfaction.
For intermediate −1 < ρ < 1 values, SEO can improve consumer satisfaction for some α
values.
2. Suppose α is small. When ρ = −1, both sites’ profits are decreasing in α. When ρ = 1, sites’
profits are decreasing in α, except for the higher quality site, whose profits are increasing iff
vH > 2vL.
The first part demonstrates the main effect of equilibrium SEO investments on the ranking.
The SEO mechanism gives both sites incentives to invest in trying to improve their ranking, but
favors bidders with high valuations. Since the search engine cannot measure site qualities perfectly,
this mechanism corrects some of the error when valuations are positively correlated with qualities.
On the flip side, when lower quality sites have high valuations for traffic, SEO creates incentives
that are not compatible with the utilities of consumers. In this latter case, the high valuation sites
that are not relevant can get ahead by investing in SEO. Examples are cases of “spammer” sites
6We need to assume σ > q1 − q2 for the error to have any effect. The Online Appendix illustrates equivalent
results for general distribution of the errors.
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that intentionally mislead consumers. Consumers gain little utility from visiting such sites, but
these sites may profit from consumer visits.
Closer examination of the proof suggests that ∂P (α,σ)
∂α∂σ
is positive for small α’s. This suggests,
somewhat counter-intuitively, that investments against SEO on the search engine’s part comple-
ment investments in better search algorithms rather than substitute them. That is, only search
engines that are already very good at estimating true qualities should fight hard against SEO. Nev-
ertheless, as measurement error can depend on exogenous factors and can vary from keyword to
keyword, it may make sense to allow higher levels of SEO in areas where the quality measurement
is very noisy.
To analyze the relationship between α and advertiser profits we focus on small levels7 of
α. As the second part of the proposition shows, the player with the lower valuation is always
worse off with higher SEO effectiveness regardless of its quality. The only site that benefits from
SEO is the one with a quality advantage, and only if its valuation is substantially higher than
its competitor’s. The intuition follows from the fact that higher levels of SEO emphasize the
differences in valuations; the higher the difference the more likely that the higher valuation will
win. Importantly, an advantage in valuation only helps when the site also has a higher quality,
that is, spammer sites with low quality and high valuation will not benefit from SEO due to the
intense competition with better sites.
3.2 The role of sponsored links
We now examine how the availability of sponsored advertising changes the incentive of investing
in SEO and the resulting link order. Since the search engine’s main source of revenue comes
from sponsored links, this analysis is crucial to understanding how SEO affects the search engine’s
revenue. We solve the model outlined in Section 2 with r < vH . That is, at the minimum, sites
with a high valuation will be able to pay for sponsored links. When describing the intuition, we
focus on the case of r < vL so that any site can afford sponsored links.
In order to determine advertisers’ SEO efforts and sponsored bids, we also need to uncover
where consumers start their search process. We assume that consumers always incur a small, but
positive search cost. They have rational expectations and start with the link that gives them
the highest probability of finding a high quality result without searching further. The following
proposition summarizes our main results.
7This relationship can be quite complex in the general case.
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Proposition 2 There exists a c > 0, such that if c < c then
1. In the unique equilibrium consumers begin their search on the organic side.
2. If r < vL the likelihood of a high quality organic link is increasing in α for any −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
3. If vL ≤ r, the likelihood of a high quality organic link is increasing in α iff ρ is high enough.
4. The search engine’s revenue increases in α iff the likelihood of a high quality organic link
decreases.
In short, we prove that the presence of sponsored links accentuates the potential benefits of SEO
on increasing the quality of the organic link. As α increases and SEO becomes more effective,
the probability that the higher quality site acquires the organic link increases even if advertisers’
qualities and their valuations for consumers are negatively correlated. Contrary to the commonly
held view that SEO often helps low quality sites climb to the top of the organic list if they have
enough resources, we find that in the presence of sponsored links, low quality sites cannot take
advantage of SEO. The intuition relies on the notion that sponsored links serve as a second chance
to acquire clicks from the search engine for the site that does not possess the organic link. However,
as a result of exhaustive consumer search, high quality sites enjoy a distinct advantage as they are
likely to be found no matter what position they are in. Low quality advertisers, on the other hand,
suffer if a higher quality competitor is also on the search page. Thus a low quality site’s incentive
to obtain the organic link will be reduced, while high quality sites will face less competition in the
SEO game and will be more likely to win it. For high quality sites, the main value of acquiring
the top organic link is not merely the access to consumers. Instead, the high quality site benefits
from the organic link because it does not have to pay for the access to consumers, as it would have
to on the sponsored side.
In the ensuing equilibrium, high quality advertisers always spend more on SEO than their low
quality competitors. Since this increases the chances of high quality organic links, we find that
rational consumers start their search on the organic side. Consumers benefit from finding a high
quality link as early as possible, and thus more effective SEO increases their welfare by increasing
the likelihood of a high quality organic link. This fact, however, hurts the search engine whose
revenues decrease when the high quality advertiser competes less for the sponsored link. The
misalignment between consumer welfare and search engine profits has already been recognized by
White (2009) and Taylor (2012). Our results reconfirm this tension and shed light on an interesting
fact: The main danger of SEO for search engines is not the disruption of the organic list which
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has long-term impact on reputation and visitors, but rather decreased revenues on the sponsored
side which are of a short-term nature. Often advertisers pay third parties to conduct SEO services
instead of paying the search engine for sponsored links. The result from the advertiser’s perspective
is not much different, but the search engine is stripped of significant revenues.
The search engine has an important tool on the sponsored side – setting the minimum bid
that affects what the winning advertiser pays. In the absence of SEO, an increased minimum
bid directly increases the revenue from advertisers who have a valuation above the minimum bid.
When SEO is possible the situation is different:
Corollary 1 There exists an rˆ(α) > 0 such that the search engine’s revenue is increasing in r
for r < rˆ(α) and decreasing for rˆ(α) < r < vL. When vL is high enough then rˆ(α) is the unique
optimal minimum bid which is decreasing in α.
The inverse U-shape of the effect is a result of two opposing forces. An increasing minimum
bid increases revenue directly. However, in the presence of SEO, a higher minimum bid makes
sites invest more in SEO, which makes the high quality site more likely to acquire the organic link.
This, in turn, will lower sponsored revenues as most of these revenues come from the case when
the low quality site possesses the organic link. The combination of these two forces will make the
search engine’s revenue initially increase with an increased minimum bid, but begin to decrease
when sites invest more in SEO. The maximal profit is reached at a lower minimum bid as SEO
becomes more effective (α increases). Finally, we examine how a site’s revenues are affected by
SEO.
Corollary 2 If r < vL and the two sites have different qualities, the profit of the higher quality
site increases, while the profit of the lower quality site decreases in α.
As we explained above, the possibility of using sponsored links as a backup gives an advantage
to the higher quality site. The more effective search engine optimization is, the less the site has
to spend to secure the top organic link. The lower quality site faces the exact opposite situation.
When the two sites have the same qualities SEO only makes a difference when those qualities are
low. In this case a higher α benefits the site with the higher valuation.
4 Conclusion
The options facing consumers when using an online search engine are highly affected by search
engine marketing decisions made by website owners and the policy of the search engine. Site
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owners can choose to invest in SEO effort to promote their site in organic listings as well as bid for
sponsored links. Search engines can choose to handicap SEO activities or to impose a minimum
bid requirement. We find that, contrary to popular belief, SEO can sometimes be beneficial
to consumers by giving an advantage to high quality sites, especially when the search engine’s
crawling algorithms do not provide an accurate ranking. Such improvement in the quality of
search results will attract more consumers, yet will hurt the revenues of search engines.
Our results also provide important recommendations to advertisers. When organic links are
the only option, SEO is an important tool to increase a site’s visibility for advertisers who can
afford to pay more. The majority of online advertisers invest in both SEO and sponsored links,
and face an important dilemma as to how to allocate their budget between the two activities. Our
results imply that high quality sites have an advantage as they can always use sponsored links as
a backup option if their organic link does not place well. Consequently, the main value of SEO
for them is to avoid the potentially hefty payments for sponsored clicks.
We believe that the economics of search engine optimization is a topic of high importance for
both academics and practitioners. In this paper we examine the basic forces of this intriguing,
complex ecosystem. Given the complexity of the problem, our model has a number of limitations
that could be explored by future research. First, we model SEO as a static game, whereas in
reality sites invest in SEO dynamically, reacting to each other’s and the search engine’s actions.
Our static approach limits our ability to explore how the search engine’s reputation is affected
in the long run. Second, we focus our attention on a single keyword with one organic and one
sponsored link throughout the paper. In reality, advertisers bid for millions of keywords to obtain
sponsored links. Conducting SEO is less a fine-grained activity and may affect the ranking of a
site for several different keywords. Third, we use the term SEO exclusively for black-hat type
optimization, and do not model white-hat methods that directly increase quality. Finally, we
assume that consumers search rationally and stick to their objectives. In reality, consumers might
make mistakes or get distracted by different types of links leading to clicks that our model does not
predict. Despite these limitations, we believe that our paper is an important step in the direction
of understanding the role of search engine optimization in marketing.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Let Fεi−εj be the c.d.f. of a triangle distribution εi − εj ∼ T [−σ, σ] with mean zero and fεi−εj
be its p.d.f. Each website faces the following first order condition w.r.t. to their scores resulting
from the profit function:
vi · fεi−εj(s¯i − s¯j) =
s¯i − qi
α2
, (3)
where s¯i = Eεi [si]. Let x = s¯i − s¯j and µ = qi − qj. By subtracting both F.O.Cs and using the
fact that fεi−εj is symmetric around zero we can rewrite the condition as:
fεi−εj(x) =
x− µ
α2(vi − vj) (4)
An interior solution x∗ would require both F.O.Cs and the S.O.Cs to hold as well as −σ ≤ x∗ ≤ σ.
When vi > vj and α
2 ≥ −σ µ
vi−vj , or when vi < vj and α
2 < σ µ
vj−vi , the equilibrium solution is
s∗i − s∗j = x∗R = σ
2µ+σα2(vi−vj)
σ2+α2(vi−vj) . When vi < vj and α
2 ≥ σ µ
vj−vi , or when vi > vj and α
2 < −σ µ
vi−vj ,
the equilibrium solution is s∗i − s∗j = x∗L = σ
2µ+σα2(vi−vj)
σ2−α2(vi−vj)
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We can immediately verify that the condition σ > µ ensures that −σ ≤ x ≤ σ, while α2 < σ2
vH
ensures that both the F.O.Cs and the S.O.Cs hold. Under the condition on α, the equilibrium
point is a unique extremum, and thus a global maximum.
To examine the effects of the equilibrium SEO investment on the ranking efficiency and con-
sumer satisfaction, we let P (α) denote the probability that the player with the highest quality
wins the organic link. Assume qH = q1 > q2 = qL. In the perfectly correlated case x
∗ = x∗R. We
then have P (α) = Fε1−ε2(x
∗
R) and P
′(α) = fε1−ε2(x
∗
R)
∂x
∂α
∣∣
x=x∗R
> 0. In the perfectly negatively
correlated case, when ρ = −1, we have x∗ = x∗L, thus P ′(α) = fε1−ε2(x∗L) ∂x∂α
∣∣
x=x∗L
< 0. Building
on the two extreme cases, one can show for intermediate correlation values that P (α) > P (0) for
certain α > 0 and 0 < ρ < 1.
To prove the second part, when ρ = −1 taking the derivative with respect to α of the profit
functions of both players shows that at the limit of α → 0, the profit never increases for any of
the equilibrium conditions. It should be noted that at some conditions the profit might increase
for higher values of α. When ρ = 1 solving directly for player 1:
pii(α)− pii(α = 0) = pii(α)|x∗ − v1Fε1−ε2(qH − qL) > 0 (5)
yields the conditions vH > 2vL or α
2 > σ
2(2vL−vH)
(vH−vL)2 , where the latter condition is ruled out if α is
small enough. For player 2, the same exercise shows there is no solution for α > 0 that increases
player 2’s profit.
Proof of Proposition 2: We use backward induction and first determine the sponsored
bids given the allocation of the organic link, then the SEO investments in three different cases
with respect to the site qualities. Initially, we assume that consumers start with the organic link.
Later we will show that this is an equilibrium strategy and that starting with the sponsored link
cannot be (Part 1 of the proposition). We will also determine the threshold c. We start with the
r < vL case and then show how the analysis changes for vL ≤ r < vH . Let wO denote the organic
and wS the sponsored winner. The main technique we use is to compare the profits in equilibrium
when the player occupies and does not occupy the organic link. The difference between these
profits is the value of the organic link for that player.
Case I: When qi = qj = qH , consumers stop searching at the organic link and do not search
further. This renders the sponsored link useless for both players leading to no valid bids above
the reserve price, r. The SEO game is therefore equivalent to the case with no sponsored links.
Case II: When qi = qj = qL, consumers will not be satisfied with the organic link and continue
to the sponsored link as long as it does not lead to the same site. If site i is the organic winner,
14
then ctri = 0 for the sponsored link, leaving the sponsored link for site j 6= i to win at a price per
click equal to r. Since qi = qj, consumers do not go back to the organic link, leaving 0 profits for
site i. The organic link is worthless, therefore no site will invest in SEO.
Case III: When qi = qH and qj = qL, consumers will stop at the organic link if wO = i. Just
as in Case I, no site will submit a valid bid higher than r. If wO = j, consumers will not be
satisfied with a low quality organic link and will continue searching, as long as the sponsored link
is different from the organic. As in Case II, ctri = 1 and ctrj = 0, leading to wS = i at a price
per click of r. Hence site i, with the high quality, will capture all the demand regardless of which
position it is in. When wO = i, this will lead to pi
O
i = vi, but when wO = j and wS = i, site i
has to pay for the sponsored link and piSi = vi − r. The value of winning the organic link will
therefore be piOi − piSi = r for site i and piOj − piSj = 0 for site j. Applying the results of Proposition
1 with v′i = r, v
′
j = 0, q
′
i = qH , q
′
j = qL, we get the optimal SEO efforts and the probability of a
high quality organic link:
e∗i =
αr(σ − qH + qL)
α2r + σ2
, e∗j = 0, P
∗ = P (α|qi = qH , qj = qL) = 1− 1
2
(
σ(σ − qH + qL)
α2r + σ2
)2
. (6)
P ∗ is increasing in α, that is, wO = i becomes more likely as α increases regardless of ρ, proving
Part 2 of the Proposition.
In Part 3, when vL ≤ r < vH the analysis is identical to the above except in Case III, when
wO = j and vi = vL < r. In this case site i with qi = qH cannot afford the sponsored link
and will profit piOi − piSi = vL − 0 = vL from getting the organic link, whereas site j will profit
piOj − piSj = vH − 0 = vH . According to Proposition 1 a higher α decreases Pr(wO = i), but the
probability of this case is Pr(qi = qH , qj = qL, vi = vL, v = vH) =
(
1−ρ
4
)2
, which decreases with ρ
and reaches 0 when ρ = 1. Thus, SEO will only increase the probability of the high quality site
acquiring the organic link if ρ is high enough, proving Part 3.
Returning to Part 1, combining the three cases, it is clear that the organic link is more likely
to be of high quality than the sponsored link. It is therefore rational for consumers to start their
search with the organic link. On the other hand, assuming that consumers start with the sponsored
link, redoing the same analysis shows that even then the organic link is more likely to be high
quality. Starting with the sponsored link is therefore never an equilibrium strategy. Furthermore,
in order to determine c, we need to calculate the expected benefit of continuing the search when
finding qL. This is simply (qH−qL) Pr(qwS = qH |qwO = qL) = (qH−qL) (1/2)(1−P
∗)
(1/4)+(1/2)(1−P ∗) , where P
∗ is
defined in (6). For a consumer to even start searching it is sufficient to assume c < qL. Therefore,
c = min
(
qL, (qH − qL) 1− P
∗
3/2− P ∗
)
(7)
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To prove Part 4, we only need to examine Case III, since neither consumer welfare nor search
engine revenue is affected by SEO in Case I and Case II. In Case III, consumers always find qH
eventually, but they are better off finding it right away, when wO = i. Therefore, consumer welfare
increases iff P (α) increases. On the other hand, search engine revenues are higher when the low
quality site acquires the organic link, that is, the revenue increases iff P (α) decreases, proving
Part 4.
Proof of Corollary 1: Consumers only click the sponsored link if the organic link is of
low quality. Thus, the search engine’s revenue is RSE = (1 − P (α)) · r, since the search engine
makes exactly r when the low quality site gets the organic link. From the proof of Proposition 1,
we can derive P (α) = P (α, r) = 3
4
− σ2(σ−qH+qL)2
4(σ2+rα2)2
which is clearly increasing in r. Differentiating
the revenue with respect to r yields ∂R
SE
∂r
= 1−P (α, r)− r · ∂P (α,r)
∂r
= 1
4
+ σ
2(σ−qH+qL)2(σ2−rα2)
4(σ2+rα2)3
. The
above derivative is positive if r is below a suitable rˆ(α), leading to an inverse U-shaped revenue
function below vL. The implicit function theorem yields that rˆ(α) is decreasing.
Proof of Corollary 2: When r < vL the higher quality site has an effective valuation of r
for the organic link, whereas the low quality site has an effective valuation of 0. From the proof
of Proposition 1, it is clear that the high quality site has an increasing chance of acquiring the
organic link and its profit increases as α increases.
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